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Abstract 
The article examines the adoption of Flexicurity principles in Portugal and Greece during 
2006-2009. Despite the similar conditions between the two cases and common EU stimulus, 
the process and final outcomes in the reform of their employment protection systems differed. 
In Portugal, the government persevered and implemented a reform in line with Flexicurity 
principles. By contrast, the Greek government initially favoured Flexicurity and initiated a 
reform process of the legal framework; however the reform was halted. The article explains 
this divergence by combining the insights of Europeanization and Varieties of Capitalism 
literatures. It is argued that in cases of Mixed Market Economies, ‘misfit’ with EU stimuli is 
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for institutional change. Instead, reforms depend on 
union structure and existence of policy entrepreneurs favouring reform, which explain the 
divergent reform paths.  
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Introduction 
Flexicurity is one of the policies that the European Commission put forward as a means 
to ‘modernize’ the European Social Model (Klindt, 2011). The objective of striking ‘the right 
balance between flexibility and security’ appeared first in the 1997 Green Paper ‘Partnership 
for a new organization of work’ of the European Commission. The adoption of Flexicurity as 
best practice signified an effort by the EU to ‘square the circle’ by reconciling the previously 
antithetical concepts of flexibility and security. This neologism did not assume flexibility and 
security as mutually exclusive but a precondition for each other, Therefore, it deviated from 
the traditional pro-flexibility stance of other international organisations – especially the 
OECD (Commission, 2007b, pp. 10-11; Klindt, 2011). Flexicurity was introduced as an EES 
stimulus in 2007 and immediately overshadowed other EES goals (Bolton et al., 2015). The 
European Commission’s published its ‘Communication on Flexicurity’ in June 2007. The 
policy had four main pillars: flexible and reliable contracts in labour law; life-long learning; 
effective active labour market policies; and social security systems which provide adequate 
income support (Commission, 2007a, pp. 12).  
Thus, the policy of Flexicurity became the new mantra of the European Employment 
Strategy (EES) and member-states were asked in 2007 to examine ways of incorporating 
Flexicurity into their national employment systems. This effort was successful in some cases 
(Jessoula et al., 2010; Peeters et al., 2008) but stumbled upon several obstacles in others. One 
of the key obstacles included the vast institutional diversity of European models of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003) and welfare/social models (Sapir, 2006), which 
made the implementation of Flexicurity difficult. To overcome these obstacles the 
Commission stressed that it was not aiming towards ‘a one-size-fits-all’ policy and suggested 
four different ‘pathways’ for EU member-states (Commission, 2007a; 2007b).  
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In Southern Europe, the Flexicurity pathway envisaged either extending a series of 
rights to outsiders (e.g. equal pay, health and social security rights to workers on fixed-
term/part-time/on-call contracts) or redesigning their open-ended contracts by making them 
more flexible (e.g. companies giving all employees open-ended contracts with progressive 
build-up of job protection) (Commission, 2007a, p. 29). In other words, the main focus was 
on the component of Flexicurity that was predominantly linked to the reduction of strictness 
in Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) (see: Commission, 2007a, p. 38; Auer, 2011, 
pp. 374-375). According to the OECD, EPL refers to ‘all types of employment protection 
measures, whether grounded primarily in legislation, court rulings, collectively bargained 
conditions of employment and customary practice’ (1999, p. 50). This was the only issue 
discussed in the relevant section of the Commission’s Communication on Flexicurity as the 
main factor behind low labour mobility and employability (Commission, 2007a; Bolton et al., 
2015). The Commission also highlighted the negative effect on vulnerable groups ‘such as 
young people, women, older workers and the long-term unemployed’ which results in the 
‘segmentation of the labour market which Flexicurity seeks to address’ (Commission, 2007a, 
p. 12).  
The article focuses on Greece and Portugal, which constitute the ‘antipode’ of the 
Flexicurity principles in terms of their domestic labour market and welfare institutions. 
Therefore, they are construed as two critical cases for institutional change in this area. 
Additionally, the Commission outlined a similar Flexicurity pathway for both countries, 
namely tackling labour market segmentation between insiders and outsiders. Hence, the focus 
of this article is on EPL reform and not the other constituents of Flexicurity. As will be 
shown below, despite the similar conditions and common stimulus, the process and final 
outcomes in the adoption of Flexicurity principles differed. The Portuguese government 
persevered and reformed the employment protection system in accordance with the 
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Flexicurity principles. By contrast, the Greek government initially favoured Flexicurity as a 
policy goal, but the reform process was halted. 
The article seeks to answer the question of whether, how and to what extent the EES 
influenced domestic institutional change in the specific areas of EPL with regard to 
Flexicurity. It attempts to explain an empirical puzzle observed in two countries of the 
Southern European periphery, and answer critical questions related to employment policy in 
Europe. More specifically, the article seeks to explain the observed divergent paths of 
institutional change by combining the insights of the Europeanization and Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) frameworks (see Thatcher, 2007; Menz, 2005). Contrary to earlier studies, 
this article focuses on EPL, which constitutes a key part of VoC institutional spheres and one 
of the prominent policy areas of the EES. Thus, this policy area is a prime field of application 
for both frameworks. It is argued that in cases of Mixed Market Economies, ‘misfit’ with EU 
stimuli is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for institutional change. Instead, reforms 
depend on union structure and existence of policy entrepreneurs favouring reform. The latter 
are the critical factors that explain the diverse outcomes in employment protection reforms in 
the cases of Greece and Portugal.  
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The first section sets out the study’s 
analytical framework grounded in the VoC and Europeanization literatures. The second 
section outlines the research design of this article, specifying the case selection criteria and 
provides details on data sources. The third section presents empirical evidence from two 
cases of employment protection reform in Portugal and Greece. The fourth section discusses 
the findings of this article, while the final section concludes considering the contribution and 
limitations of the study. 
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I. Institutional Change in Europe: Europeanization, Varieties of Capitalism or both? 
Recent scholarly work that examined institutional change in European labour markets 
draws heavily on the theoretical frameworks of Europeanization and VoC (Graziano, et al., 
2011; Lallement, 2011; Van Rie and Marx, 2012). The two frameworks seem to be evolving 
in parallel, as only few studies have attempted to combine them (Featherstone, 2008). 
Conventionally, the VoC framework focused on the pressures that stem from wider processes 
of globalization and global intensification of competition. Hall and Soskice (2001) suggested 
that there are two models of capitalism that appear ‘fit’ for globalization; the Coordinated 
Market Economies and the Liberal Market Economies. Subsequent studies sought to extend 
this dual typology by incorporating cases from Southern European countries (Amable, 2003; 
Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Much of the VoC literature was attuned on examining the 
pressures that global competition brought towards institutional convergence by means of 
mimetic processes of isomorphism. As a result, there has been very little work looking into 
supranational pressures for convergence in institutional arrangements, stemming from 
policies of the EU. The notable exception to this, are the studies that consider the EU impact 
on domestic product markets regulation (Menz, 2005; Thatcher, 2007). The present article 
seeks to extend this literature, by looking at the EU’s impact on domestic EPL. 
The VoC literature offered several insights to explain the prospect for divergent 
outcomes in institutional reforms. First, it is broadly accepted that EU member states belong 
to different models of capitalism. This implies that member states have categorically different 
institutional configurations in their employment protection systems due to historical path-
dependencies (Amable, 2003). Additionally, the VoC framework suggests that different 
models of capitalism exhibit different ‘institutional complementarities’, and thereby, 
comparative advantage in different domains ( Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 19-20). A priori, if 
the EU stimulus was not internally consistent to fit a particular institutional model, the 
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efficacy of the pursued institutional reform is expected to be limited (Amable, 2009). The 
observable implication is that the most likely outcome is path-dependent change or stability 
making divergent outcomes not only possible, but also likely.  
In order to explain path-dependent change, attention has been accorded to domestic 
actors’ coalitions (Hall and Thelen, 2009; ). Instead of similar outcomes across member 
states, the process of adjustment is expected to differ according to the pre-existing 
institutional constellation of actors (Thatcher, 2007). This line of reasoning suggests that the 
key factors explaining domestic change include the ‘shared understandings’ and ‘common 
knowledge’ (Culpepper, 2008) that actors hold and underpin such coalitions in favour of (or 
against) institutional change. Especially in the institutional context of Mixed Market 
Economies, the state assumes an important role for pushing reforms and shaping the direction 
of institutional change (Hall and Gingerich, 2009).  
More recently, a body of literature shifted the focus away from path-dependence and 
stability, towards the different mechanisms of institutional change that may be observed 
across political economy settings. Notably, Streeck and Thelen (2006, p.19-29) distinguished 
between five modes of change: displacement; layering; drift; conversion; and exhaustion. The 
different modes of change imply that path-dependent and transformative elements may co-
exist in different degrees and levels. In other words, what may appear as stability and 
continuity on the surface; may entail slow and incremental processes of change that 
cumulatively lead to institutional corrosion or transformation.  
Conversely, the Europeanization literature developed a number of causal mechanisms 
and conditions under which Europeanization is likely (cf. Featherstone, 2003; Moumoutzis, 
2011; Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2016). Börzel and Risse argue that most of the causal 
mechanisms share two main propositions: first, in order for Europeanization to take place 
‘there must be some degree of ‘misfit’ or incompatibility between European-level processes, 
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policies, and institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and 
institutions on the other’ (2003, p. 58). Although the necessity of misfit has been persuasively 
challenged,–especially regarding its applicability to soft law areas (Radaelli, 2003), scholars 
have applied the concept to employment policy by mainly referring to the difference between 
EU and domestic levels with regard to policy/institutional content (Graziano et al., 2011).  
The Europeanization literature relies significantly on new institutionalism to develop 
and highlight causal mechanisms and intervening/mediating factors that respond to the 
adaptational pressures and either enable or prohibit change to explain domestic adaptation 
and outcomes. Admittedly, convergent pressures may not necessarily lead to convergence in 
processes and outcomes. Instead, the outcomes should generally be considered to be 
differential (Börzel and Risse 2003). This study follows recent studies on the impact of the 
EES on member states’ employment policies (Zartaloudis, 2013, p. 1181; Zartaloudis 2015), 
where Europeanization can occur via three key mutually exclusive channels: (1) policy 
learning (Europeanization occurs after a new, EES-inspired governmental agenda which 
differs from the previous one with regard to the content of national employment policy); (2) 
domestic empowerment (Europeanization occurs from policymakers who exploit the EES in 
order to promote their own agenda); and (3) financial conditionality (Europeanization occurs 
from attempts to meet the conditions for ESF funding). 
 
II. Research Design and Methods 
The study gathered qualitative data to examine in comparative fashion the impact of EU 
stimuli on two country cases selected on the basis of theoretically informed selection criteria 
(Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis, 2016, pp. 344-46). Greece and Portugal are considered as two 
least-likely or critical cases of EES-induced Europeanization with regard to Flexicurity. First,  
they both share characteristics identified in the literature that prohibit Europeanization - 
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including weak administrations, fragmented social partnership, lack of cooperation between 
different actors and a culture showing neglect of EU policies (Hartlapp and Leiber, 2010). 
Second, both cases have residual and underdeveloped welfare states that differ markedly 
from Denmark or the Netherlands which are considered as the archetypes of Flexicurity 
(Auer 2011). Third, they are both close to the ideal-types of Mixed Market Economies (Hall 
and Gingerich, 2009). Finally, both cases exhibit a very high level of strictness in OECD’s 
EPL (OECD, 1999). This also suggests a high level of ‘misfit’ between the EU stimuli and 
the Greek and Portuguese employment systems that created ‘adaptational’ pressure in their 
models of capitalism.  
The article follows the ‘most similar cases/different outcomes’ comparative research 
design (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009, p.21). Despite the fact that the two cases are very 
similar, the process and final outcomes in the implementation of Flexicurity principles 
differed. The timeframe of the case studies is set during 2006-2009, in order to capture the 
reform dynamics following the publication of the Commission’s Communication on 
Flexicurity. The article does not examine the period after the eruption of the European 
sovereign debt crisis (2010 onwards), because both Portugal and Greece implemented a series 
of externally imposed reforms as a result of the financial assistance they received in order to 
remain into the Eurozone and avoid financial collapse (cf. Johnston and Aidan, 2015; 
Kornelakis and Voskeritsian, 2014; Theodoropoulou, 2015; Zartaloudis 2014).  
Data collection followed a qualitative bottom-up process tracing approach whereby the 
research examines the chain of events and temporal sequences between the key outcomes of 
interest. It examines domestic policies and agendas before and after the introduction of the 
EES stimuli and ‘goes up’ to find whether the EES can explain the examined cases 
(Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009, p. 510). The article uses North's definition of institutions 
whereby  ‘institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
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humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (1990, p. 3). According to North 
formal institutions include statute law, common law and contracts.  
Process tracing is usually supported by the following tools: qualitative content analysis 
of official documents, media, academic and specialist publications; the examination of 
temporal sequencing of events and decisions; and interviews with key informants. Hence this 
study collected and triangulated different types of evidence, including: (i) 44 qualitative 
semi-structured non-attributing interviews with key informants; (ii) EU and national official 
documents relevant to the policy areas under examination (for example, National Action 
Plans, evaluation reports, laws, party manifestos, parliamentary debates and speeches); (iii) 
secondary evidence from the policy literature, including reports from the European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO) database; and (iv) newspaper articles. Within groups of 
informants the triangulation took place by collecting a variety of perspectives from actors 
with divergent interests (social partners, government officials, policy and academic experts).  
Purposive sampling was used to select the sample of interviewees from the population 
of individuals involved in the policy process. The sample was identified by using the snow-
balling technique. This technique is suitable to locate subjects belonging to concealed and 
hard-to-reach populations (Atkinson and Flint 2004) and was deemed appropriate to penetrate 
the unknown and rather close-knit ministerial elites involved in Greek and Portuguese policy 
making.	The fieldwork stage took place in Lisbon and Athens in the period between March 
2009 and September 2010. The length of interviews varied from 1 hour to 2 hours.	 All 
interviews were conducted in person and were recorded using a voice recorder. The 
interviewees gave their consent for the use of their quotes and attributing the quotes to them.  
The interview instrument was an interview guide with broad thematic questions that 
investigated the interests, positions and perceptions of key actors with regard to the examined 
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case studies. The questions focused especially on how interviewees perceived the examined 
policy change/stability and what was their role in the examined case studies.  
The research was conducted in three main stages. Firstly, a preliminary review of the 
existing academic and policy literature led to the identification of a significant research gap in 
the cases of Greece and Portugal. To address this gap primary data was collected through 
interviews with key informants. Thirdly, empirical evidence was also collected through an 
extensive online search for secondary and primary sources  as well as documents cited by the 
interviewees in this study. All data were combined to establish the reasons behind policy 
change/inertia whereby any interview data had to be colloborated with other sources 
(documents, media, policy reports) and vice versa. The results of this research are presented 
below.   
 
III. Flexicurity and Employment Protection Legislation Reform 
 
The successful reform in Portugal 
The Portuguese reform started with the appointment of an Expert Committee by the 
centre-left Socialist party (PS) – shortly after its victory in the 2005 elections. The Committee 
concluded its work in April 2006 by producing the Green Paper on Labour Relations. The 
paper included the concept of Flexicurity in its final chapter as ‘an issue that was currently 
debated at EU level’ (EIRO, 2007a). When it was presented to the social partners, the Green 
Paper did not cause any serious controversy (EIRO, 2008a), but the largest trade union, the 
Communist-leaning CGTP-IN, argued that the document favoured flexibility (Cerdeira, 2007, 
p. 48). Following the publication of the Commission’s Communication, the PS government 
initiated a public debate on Flexicurity in late 2006 (EIU, 2007, p. 20), by organising several 
conferences with representatives from the social partners, academia and civil society (EIRO, 
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2007b). Moreover, the Labour Minister Vieira da Silva took an active role in the Flexicurity 
debate. Indeed, as a key informant noted: 
“… his role was a balancing act between promoting Flexicurity at the EU level - as 
Portugal held the EU Presidency during June-December 2007 - and avoiding the 
provocation of domestic reactions by appearing too one-sided in its policy direction”.1 
 
Hence, in his early speeches, da Silva was cautious about adopting the Flexicurity 
model and emphasised that importing foreign models was impossible (EIRO, 2007b; 
Michalaki, 2009). Additionally, he argued that ‘the final solution had to be found by the 
Portuguese social partners’. Gradually, however, he started to express a more favourable 
stance towards adopting Flexicurity as he maintained that this would be equally advantageous 
for both employers and employees (Michalaki, 2009, pp. 13-14). 
The social partners appeared sceptical about the possibility of Portugal adopting the EU 
Flexicurity model given the: (i) stark differences between Northern Europe (especially 
Denmark which was used by the government as a model) and Portugal in economic and 
labour market conditions; (ii) Portugal’s weakness in implementing effective life-long 
learning policies; (iii) its inability to increase unemployment benefits to the Scandinavian 
standards (EIRO, 2009b). For Portuguese trade unions the intention of the government was to 
promote flexibility in order to satisfy employers (Cerdeira, 2007; EIRO, 2009b). Although 
Portuguese employers’ associations were also sceptical of the Flexicurity policy,2 some of 
them supported the idea of adopting the model. For instance, the Vice-President of the 
Confederation of Portuguese Industry, Heitor Salgueiro, and the President of the Portuguese 
Trade and Services Confederation, José António Silva publicly supported Flexicurity as the 
																																								 																				
1 Interview, Portuguese Labour Ministry (PT-LM) no.1, Lisbon, June 2010. 
2 Interviews, PT-LM no.2 and 3, Lisbon, June 2010. 
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way forward for Portugal’s economy (see EIRO, 2007b). When the President of the Republic 
declared that he also favoured Flexicurity as a model for Portugal (Michalaki, 2009), the 
trade unions responded with a full-blown attack on the European Commission’s ‘neo-liberal 
project’ emphasising the detrimental effects to workers’ rights (Cerdeira, 2007, p. 48). 
In spite of this reaction, the government persevered in its labour market reform agenda 
and appointed an Expert Committee with the task of making concrete proposals for the 
upcoming labour market reform.3  The work of the Committee was finalised with the 
publication of the 2007 White Paper on Labour Relations. As a key member of the White 
Paper Committee noted: 
“…due to the backlash against the concept of Flexicurity, the Committee decided to 
remove the term ‘Flexicurity’ from the final draft of the White Paper’s 
recommendations.4 
 
Nonetheless, it adopted very similar recommendations to the earlier 2006 Portuguese 
Green Paper and favoured a combination of internal flexibility and security (EIRO, 2008b). 
As one high-level official involved in the authorship of the White Paper and the entire reform 
process put it: 
“The White Paper followed an identical approach to the 2006 Green Paper. Although 
the term Flexicurity was completely abandoned to avoid further confrontation with the 
social partners, it was certainly a guiding principle of the policy suggestions since 
there was continuity between the Green Paper, the White Paper and the final labour 
market reform law”.5 
																																								 																				
3 Interviews, PT-LM no.4 and 5,; independent experts no.1-3, Lisbon, June 2010. 
4 Interview, White Paper Committee member, Lisbon, June 2010. 
5 Interview, PT-LM no.6, Lisbon, June 2010. 
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In essence, the White Paper included proposals tackling all aspects of labour law 
legislation. It aimed at undoing the 2003 labour market reform of the centre-right PSD-PP 
(Social Democratic Party and People’s Party) government and reducing the Portuguese EPL, 
which was a goal in line with the Flexicurity pathway. The most controversial 
recommendations concerned the favourability principle in collective bargaining, the 
regulation of fixed-term contracts, and the limits to individual and collective dismissals. The 
unions were against these measures, while the employers welcomed those proposals.6 The 
employers also asked for: more flexibility in individual dismissals; the complete abolition of 
compulsory reinstatement for workers found to have been unlawfully dismissed (which, in 
most cases, is allowed by the White Paper’s recommendations); and relaxing restrictions on 
collective dismissals, working time duration, length of force and lapsing of collective 
agreements (sobrevigência) (see EIRO, 2008c). 
The next step of the labour market reform was initiated on the 22nd of April 2008 when 
the Labour Minister da Silva presented his draft law proposal to all social partners. The law 
aimed to adopt a Flexicurity approach by promoting both flexibility and security in order to 
reach consensus from all social partners and promote the goal of EPL reduction as the 
government intended.7 To promote flexibility the draft proposed: to increase working-time 
flexibility and decentralise collective bargaining as the new working time rules and pay 
agreements could be decided at firm level; remove maximum limits of working time; reduce 
penalties on illegal dismissals and redundancy costs (EIRO, 2008d). To promote security the 
draft law: proposed new sanctions for labour offences; made dependent work eligible for 
																																								 																				
6 Interviews, PT-LM no.7 and 8; UGT member; independent experts no.2 and 4, Lisbon, 
June 2010. 
7 Interviews, PT-LM no.3 and 4; independent experts no.1 and 3, Lisbon, April 2010.  
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labour inspection and judicial control aiming to combat spurious self-employment; limited 
fixed-term contracts to three years; introduced an open-ended contract allowing part-time 
employees to enjoy full employment rights; and banned unpaid extra-curricular training. 
Finally, the labour law proposal included amendments of the social security legislation 
aiming at the reduction or exemption of social security contributions for some workers to 
reduce non-wage labour costs (EIRO, 2008d). 
Portuguese social partners expressed strong disagreement with most aspects of both the 
White Paper and the subsequent draft Law: employers asked for further time, pay and 
contractual flexibility, whereas the unions asked for more security (cf. EIRO, 2007a). The 
reaction of the trade unions to the White Paper was so negative that there were hardly any 
hopes of an agreement between the social partners and the government (EIRO, 2007b). 
Nevertheless, the government was resolved to proceed8 and presented a revised draft 
proposal. After almost a month of intense negotiations, da Silva submitted his final proposal 
to the social partners for discussion. Surprisingly, agreement was reached the next day 
between social partners in the Social Concertation Committee between the employers and the 
centre-left trade union UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), while the CGTP-IN 
denounced the deal (EIRO, 2008e). The agreement was reached through specific concessions 
by the government towards the social partners (EIRO, 2008e). The concessions made towards 
the trade unions’ demands were as follows: (1) contrary to the White Paper’s 
recommendations to ease restrictions on firing and individual dismissals, only some minor 
changes concerning disciplinary procedures were made – an amendment that granted the 
agreement of the UGT; (2) contrary to the White Paper’s recommendations, the final draft of 
the law removed most provisions for a significant change concerning time-flexibility related 
to firm-level collective bargaining; (3) although the law introduced new forms of time-
																																								 																				
8 Interviews, PT-LM no. 1-10, Lisbon, April and June 2010. 
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flexibility, the final draft maintained numerous limits (see EIRO, 2008e); (4) the final draft of 
the law (in accordance with the White Paper) altered a provision of the 2003 Labour Code, 
which allowed collective agreements to provide lower standards for workers, and made 
minimum legal provisions inapplicable to contracts where collective agreements provide 
more favourable rules only for ‘core’ parts of employment relations (see EIRO, 2008e). The 
only concession to employers was that the final draft of the law did not abolish the basic 
provisions of the 2003 Labour Code on the duration and expiration of collective agreements, 
whereas the second draft included a completely new provision on extension of collective 
agreements to individual non-unionised workers (EIRO, 2008e). 
The final text of the law was approved on 7 November 2008 after three months of 
discussion in the parliament. The CGPT-IN union challenged this law by appealing to the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court. At the end of December 2008, the Constitutional Court 
decided unanimously to reject the law on the grounds that it violates the right to secure 
employment and the principle of proportionality. The government responded with 
amendments (changing the trial period for all workers from 180 to 90 days) and the 
parliament voted again for a revised version of the law on 21 January 2009. The law finally 
became effective as of 17 of February 2009. Overall, the social dialogue process lasted 
approximately three years after the publication of the initial Green Paper on Labour Relations 
and required lengthy and intense negotiations and iterations between the government, the 
social partners and the Constitutional Court. This signifies the importance of domestic 
coalitions for institutional change based on the shared understandings between different 
actors, namely trade unions, business associations and the government.  
The Portuguese case also suggests the importance of governmental policy entrepreneurs 
who persevered for the labour law reforms, in spite of resistance from social partners. 
According to the evidence collected in interviews, the government’s main motive for the 
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reform of labour law included a reduction of Portugal’s EPL score, so that Portugal would be 
no longer classified as the country with the highest EPL score in the OECD.9 Reducing EPL 
became a pressing issue since the early 2000s when Portugal started to experience rising 
unemployment levels. This development was quite unprecedented in Portugal’s recent 
history: Portugal was one of the few EU countries with very low unemployment levels 
combined with high employment rates for both men and women. 
The rising unemployment needs to be understood in the context of the 2004 EU 
enlargement, which weakened Portugal’s comparative advantage within the EU. Before the 
accession of Central and Eastern European countries, Portugal retained a ‘comparative 
advantage’ as a low labour cost region within the EU’s Single Market (EIU, 1997, pp. 12-13). 
With the 2004 EU enlargement, many EU members in Eastern and Central Europe could 
offer more competitive environments in terms of labour market regulation and costs to 
foreign companies that now could set up business there instead of Portugal. This was a 
development that increasingly became an issue of concern for Portuguese policy makers.10 As 
a key informant involved in the reform put it: 
“…Portugal’s economic model is ‘dead’ after the EU 2004 enlargement due to 
competition from countries with cheaper labour in Eastern Europe.11  
 
Evidence from interviews suggested that the PS government tried to make sure that the 
upcoming reform would surely reduce the country’s EPL in order to stop being labelled as 
																																								 																				
9 Interviews, PT-LM no.1-5, Lisbon, June 2010. 
10 Interviews, PT-LM no.1-10; independent experts no.1-3; Green Paper members 1 and 2, 
Lisbon, April and June 2010. 
11 Interview, Green Paper Committee member 1, Lisbon, June 2010.  
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the one with the highest EPL in the world.12 As a key policy maker involved directly in the 
drafting of the labour law for the PS reform suggested: 
“A huge amount of effort when making our proposals - especially when 
drafting the labour law - was devoted to having a perfect match between 
the OECD criteria for the EPL measurement and our reform. The efforts, 
especially when writing the law, was immense as we wanted to fully meet 
the OECD criteria for a low EPL score. The target was very specific: we 
had to stop having one of the highest EPL scores in the OECD and the law 
had to provide a fairer evaluation of our labour market situation. And I 
believe that we succeeded in achieving this as Portugal’s EPL score was 
dramatically reduced after our reform”.13  
 
This view was not shared by everybody in Portugal - and especially from suspicious 
trade unions who perceived the government's efforts to reduce EPL as a direct attack to 
established labour regulation which protected Portuguese workers. As one trade unionist 
opposing the reform argued:  
Reducing EPL sounds good in theory to attract foreign investment. But we 
need to remember that this would mean less protection for workers in 
Portugal. What kind of economic model is relying on growth out of human 
insecurity and misery? [...] We have already a very cheap labour force 
here. What we need is more investment in skills and education. Because 
																																								 																				
12 Interviews, PT-LM no.1-10; independent experts 1 and 2; Green Paper Committee 
members 1 and 2, Lisbon, April and June 2010. 
13 Interview, PT-LM no.11, Lisbon, June 2010. 
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you can be competitive on price but you can also be competitive on 
quality. We felt that quality was not part of the Flexicurity debate.14  
 
However, the government persevered and tried to incorporate the supranational 
pressures towards adopting contractual flexibility did not only come from the EU policy of 
Flexicurity, but also from OECD. This, however, appeared as necessary but not sufficient for 
institutional change. Instead, the reform was finally successful because Portuguese 
government appeared to be committed and the final draft was an effective compromise 
supported by a broad coalition of collective actors, satisfying their divergent interests and 
preferences.  
 
The failed reform in Greece 
Similarly to Portugal, the Greek centre-right New Democracy  government welcomed 
the call from the EU to examine ways of incorporating Flexicurity principles into Greek 
labour law. In March 2007, the Minister of Labour, Savvas Tsitouridis, established an Expert 
Committee with the task to ‘answer the specific questions included in the Commission’s 
Flexicurity Communication (Makedonia, 2008). 
 It appeared that both the Committee members and Tsitouridis, constituted a group of 
policy entrepreneurs with similar backgrounds, beliefs and a unified agenda:15 (i) all of them 
had studied abroad; (ii) most of them had a long experience with the EU and its policies; (iii) 
some of them were employment policy and labour market experts with practical experience; 
and (iv) key people of the group had a personal involvement in Greek policy making. 
According to the interview data, these characteristics were important in the formation of a 
																																								 																				
14 Interview, CGTP-IN member 1, Lisbon, June 2010. 
15 Interviews, Greek Labour Ministry (GR-LM) officials no.1-5, Athens, April 2009. 
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group of policy entrepreneurs that would try to promote a labour market reform in accordance 
to the EU’s Flexicurity principles. It appeared that for these policy entrepreneurs the EES call 
on Flexicurity was a window of opportunity to promote their pro-reform/modernisation 
agenda as all actors involved in the group shared the belief that Greece’s labour market needs 
urgent and drastic reform.16 Similarly to Portugal, therefore, Greece had a considerable 
‘misfit’ with the EU stimuli and a group of policy entrepreneurs promoting reform. 
 Another similarity between the Greek and Portuguese cases is that the Greek unions 
(represented through the peak trade unions of the private sector 'GSEE' and public sector 
'ADEDY') were quite sceptical on how realistic the transfer of the Danish model of 
Flexicurity was, as there were very few similarities between Greece and Denmark 
(Michalaki, 2009, p. 11). This became evident in 2007 when GSEE withdrew twice from the 
social dialogue on Flexicurity in fear that even participation in a debate on Flexicurity would 
imply acceptance of the term (Kwiatkiewicz, 2011, p. 13; Michalaki, 2009, p. 12). In 
particular, Greek trade unions - similarly to their Portuguese counterparts - perceived 
Flexicurity as synonymous with flexibility and as serving the interests of employers. They 
argued that flexibility should be reduced and the provision of security for workers and the 
unemployed increased (Kwiatkiewicz, 2011). In other official documents the unions argued 
that Flexicurity was an example of the EU’s insistence ‘on a model of production according 
to which labour is taken to be a cost’ (EIRO, 2009a). Moreover, the unions insisted that 
expanding the definition of ‘dependence’ to include part-time workers, who hold spurious 
self-employment contracts, should be a fundamental pre-requisite for any debate on 
Flexicurity. The government also faced opposition from the main centre-left PASOK party. 
This is particularly evidenced by the statement of PASOK MP Maria Damanaki,  and Head of 
																																								 																				
16 Interviews, GR-LM no.1-8; Expert Committee members no.1-3; independent experts no.1-
3, Athens, April-June 2009. 
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her party's group in the Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs where she argued that 
‘…the Green Paper and the Flexicurity issues it brings up are an extension of neo-liberal 
policies on employment and the responsibility for this issue was entirely up to the ND 
government’ (OBES, 2007, p.1). 
Greek employers’ associations appeared indifferent to Flexicurity. More specifically, 
the Federation of Greek Industry (SEV) never discussed Flexicurity in detail.17 In response to 
the trade unions’ harsh critique of ‘EU policies’, SEV argued for more flexibility, less 
bureaucracy and fewer administrative hurdles for businesses, as well as more time flexibility 
in the labour market. In other words, SEV took a rather similar stance to the Portuguese 
employers who favoured flexibility instead of Flexicurity. The National Confederation of 
Hellenic Commerce agreed that Flexicurity should be discussed, but it aligned itself with 
SEV’s position to focus on reducing the bureaucratic burdens that companies face as well as 
the non-wage labour costs of workers. Surprisingly, the employers’ associations that 
represented SMEs joined the trade unions in criticising the EU and its policies by arguing that 
‘in the case of Greece, the broader flexibility laid down during the last 15 years has had an 
insignificant or adverse impact on the employment front’ (EIRO, 2009a).  
Overall, the positions between different collective actors appeared markedly different 
throughout the consultation period and the associations launched attacks on each other and 
the government.18 Unsurprisingly, Greek social partners never managed to reach a consensus 
																																								 																				
17 Interviews, former SEV member; Economic and Social Committe member; independent 
experts 1-3, Athens, May 2009. 
18 Interviews, GR-LM no.1-8; Expert Committee members no.1-3; independent experts no.1-
3; Greek trade unionist no.1 and Social and Economic Committee member no.1, Athens, 
April-June 2009. 
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on what Greece’s response should be on the EES Flexicurity policy (Kwiatkiewicz, 2011, p. 
13). As a result, the Greek Economic and Social Committee decided that instead of 
attempting to make a synthesis of the social partners’ views, it would simply outline their two 
divergent positions on modernising labour law along the European Commission’s line of 
argumentation (Predosanu and Pirciog, 2008, p. 3).In this context, the Greek government 
disregarded the report of the Expert Committee and halted the whole process without ever 
initiating a discussion over a draft law. As key member of the Expert Committee suggested: 
“…we [the Greek Expert Committee] faced significant opposition from within the 
government, sometimes even stronger than the opposition parties”.  
 
Although scepticism or rejection of Flexicurity from the side of trade unions is observable in 
both countries, the Greek case differed substantially in the existence/absence of policy 
entrepreneurs advocating the reform of the employment protection framework. In particular, 
the loss of governmental support sealed the Committee’s fate. The key figures of the 
government - including the Prime Minister at the time, Costas Karamanlis, were indifferent 
or hostile to the idea of Flexicurity.19 On 28 April 2007, the Minister of Labour, Tsitouridis 
was forced to resign from his position. Tsitouridis was the most significant government 
member of the group of policy entrepreneurs. The Minister’s forced resignation took place at 
about the time that the Expert Committee was ready to publish its results in 2009. The new 
Minister of Labour, Fani Petralia, ignored the final report of the Expert Committee, and this 
marked the end of the episode with no institutional change in the EPL framework. The Greek 
government hardly ever referred to the concept of Flexicurity in its public policy discourse 
																																								 																				
19 Interviews, GR-LM no.8-12; Expert Committee members no.1-4; independent experts 
no.1-3, Athens, April-September 2009. 
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(EIRO, 2009a). As a result, there was no meaningful public debate of the concept and its 
implications for Greece. 
 
IV. Portugal and Greece in comparative perspective 
In Portugal, the evidence demonstrated that after several iterations, there was a reform 
of EPL, gathering consensus between the government, the trade unions and the employers’ 
associations. The direction of this institutional change was broadly in line with the 
expectation to tackle labour market segmentation along the Flexicurity pathways, although 
the discourse that was used abandoned the concept. Drawing on Streeck and Thelen’s 
typology of mechanisms of institutional change, the reform in Portugal seems to parallel the 
mode of ‘displacement’; whereby actors ‘work creatively with institutional legacies’, but 
these are ‘submerged by more dominant or recent practices’ (2006, p.20). The domestic 
actors in Portugal abandoned the controversial discourse of Flexicurity, but in essence 
displaced earlier regulations and merged the labour law with the dominant practices that stem 
from the Commission’s pathway to tackle labour market segmentation and reducing 
protection for insiders. This process required tactical manoeuvres from the governmental 
policy entrepreneurs and a balancing act between the employers’ associations and the reform-
friendly trade union.  
By contrast, the effort to reform the EPL in Greece was halted after a promising start. 
This is partly explained by lack of government perseverance with the reform making the 
Greek government appearing less committed on going ahead with the institutional changes in 
labour law than its Portuguese counterpart. Drawing on insights from the VoC literature we 
argue that the role of the state is expected to carry special weight in Mixed Market 
Economies. Additionally, drawing on insights from Europeanization literature we argue that 
role of policy entrepreneurs appeared to be critical in domestic empowerment from EU 
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stimuli. In conjunction, the perseverance of governmental policy entrepreneurs on the 
objective of reforming the EPL framework seems to partly explain the variation in reform 
outcomes. However, this does not seem to explain the whole variation in outcomes as policy 
entrepreneurs appeared in both cases. 
Hence, we contend that the presence or absence of actors’ coalitions in support of the 
institutional change (Hall and Thelen, 2009) mediated the process and final outcome of the 
external stimuli. Again we draw on VoC insights to explain that the Portuguese government 
managed to attain a ‘shared understanding’ (Culpepper, 2008) with one of the two trade 
unions on how to move forward through social dialogue. The corresponding process in 
Greece failed. However, the willingness of actors to carve out ‘shared understandings’ seems 
to depend on permanent features that are integral to domestic institutional contexts.  
The difference in the structure of trade unions appears to explain their willingness to be 
part of reform coalitions. More specifically, the Portuguese trade unions were 
organisationally divided. Thus, the government was able to exploit this internal rift and play 
one actor against the other (cf. Afonso et al. 2015, pp. 319-22) to strike a coalition with UGT. 
The other key actor, the Portuguese employers’ association, was easier to get on board as the 
reforms were in line with their long-standing agendas and interests. In this way, the 
Portuguese government could go ahead with the reform of the EPL, without the need to get 
the consent of the CGTP-IN. By contrast, a similar strategy of playing one actor against the 
other was not possible for the Greek government. Once the Greek government encountered 
resistance from the unitary union confederation, it abandoned the initiative altogether.  
The above findings have important implications and amend our view of the 
Europeanization literature. Although the  ‘misfit’ with EU stimuli appears as a necessary 
condition, it is not sufficient for institutional change. Empirically, we observed that in both 
countries the domestic actors did not seem to be learning from the EES. Instead, they 
  25 
appeared more interested in pursuing their own agendas vis-à-vis their domestic opponents. 
The dissatisfaction and distancing from the discourse of Flexicurity would also exacerbate the 
limited potential for learning. Indeed, the interactions between domestic actors were focused 
on carving out a workable compromise with regard to domestic reform of employment 
protection, which would suit their needs and interests. Finally, there was little evidence of 
any ‘financial conditionality’ mechanisms facilitating domestic change. There was, of course, 
no EU funding attached to the reform of labour law, so this channel was out of scope anyway.   
The findings have also implications for the VoC literature. First of all, the cases 
confirm the limits of abstract typologies that group similar countries into clusters of 
capitalism, and show that the internal dynamics of change may follow very different paths. In 
particular, the VoC framework has been criticised for being static, unable to account for 
change and an inclination to see all change as path-dependent (Hall & Thelen, 2009). While 
this seems to be confirmed by the case of Greece, which did not adopt any Flexicurity 
principles in the reform of labour law, in a genuinely path-dependent manner, the case of 
Portugal suggests that coalitions of actors centred on ‘shared understandings’ (Culpepper, 
2008) may be able to implement reforms and provoke institutional change. The relaxation of 
EPL in Portugal denotes also a trajectory of change that injected LME elements in its 
institutional configuration. Overall, the article sought to synthesise insights and argue that the 
diverse reform paths and outcomes in EPL reforms may be explained by the existence of 
policy entrepreneurs favouring reform (Europeanization), and the variation in union 
structures (VoC). These two conditions provided opportunities for new coalitions and 
compromises. 
Apart from the theoretical contribution in the Europeanization and VoC frameworks, , 
these research findings have also implications for employment policy research and practice. 
The findings confirm the argument that best practices (such as Flexicurity) cannot be 
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transplanted from one model of capitalism to another without paying attention to the 
configuration of the local institutional and political-economy context (cf. Kornelakis, 2014). 
The compatibility with the local institutional context has implications for the overall efficacy 
of employment policy interventions. Consequently, devising a government policy (especially 
when ‘downloaded’ from the EU) is not enough for reform and change. Instead, the inclusion 
and consultation with interested stakeholders/actors in the policy-making process can go a 
long way towards the successful adaptation and implementation of innovative/path-breaking 
employment policies.  
 
V. Conclusions 
The article set out to explain the divergent paths of institutional change in the policy 
area of Flexicurity (Madsen, 2002; Auer, 2011) in Portugal and Greece during 2006-2009. In 
both Greece and Portugal there was a high level of ‘misfit’ between the EU policy and 
domestic institutional arrangements on EPL, but this was not sufficient to bring about 
institutional change. In both countries domestic policy entrepreneurs tried to exploit the 
European Commission’s 2007 Communication on Flexicurity. The comparative analysis of 
two under-researched and least likely cases shed light on the sequential and iterative process 
of change, the different actors’ interactions and the critical junctures that shaped the final 
outcomes. The findings suggested that apart from the importance of governmental policy 
entrepreneurs, the actors’ coalitions and the institutional structure of trade unionism helps to 
further explain in large degree the divergent paths. Along these lines the article synthesised 
insights from the VoC and the Europeanization theoretical frameworks. This suggests that the 
frameworks should not be treated as competing. Instead, synthesising insights might go a 
long way towards explaining divergent paths of institutional change in critical cases, such as 
those in Southern Europe. 
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One limitation of this study stems from its case studies. Although the argument might 
be applicable to other cases of welfare reform, they might not be extended to categorically 
different models of capitalism such as CMEs or LMEs. Therefore, further research is needed 
in order to assess the plausibility of the argument in other EU countries. Another limitation of 
this article is that it does not consider the most recent labour market reforms that have taken 
place in Portugal and Greece since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis. That is because the 
changed economic context has fundamentally altered the requirement of consensus and 
coalitions for reform of employment regulation (Kornelakis and Voskeritsian, 2014; 
Theodoropoulou, 2015). Instead, the financial conditionality attached to bailout packages 
provide governments with massive leverage to bring about institutional change in 
employment regulation, while supranational pressures for convergence originate not only 
from the European Union but also the International Monetary Fund.  
Nevertheless, the article provides a historical example of the coalitional dynamics that 
underpin reform of employment protection systems in two critical / least-likely cases of 
MMEs and Southern European welfare states. In an era of ever-increasing external pressures 
for domestic change, these should not lead necessarily to harmonization and homogeneity, 
but domestic actors, agendas and institutional contexts shape the paths and direction of 
reforms.            
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